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Their Bugs Are
Worse than Their
Bite: Emerging Infectious
Disease and the
Human-Animal Interface

6
CHAPTER

Michael Greger, M.D.

1981: Ronald Reagan takes the oath
of office as president of the United
States, MTV starts broadcasting,
Raiders of the Lost Ark hits movie
theaters, and Pac-Mania is all the
rage. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issues a bulletin of just
nine brief paragraphs: five men in
Los Angeles with a strange cluster
of symptoms are dying.

n the twenty-five years since that
announcement, what we now
know as AIDS has killed 20 million people (National AIDS Trust
2005). Where did the AIDS virus—
and other emerging diseases, such
as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Ebola, mad cow—
come from?

I

The First
Age of Disease
The Smithsonian Institution has
identified three periods of disease
since the beginning of human evolution (Armelagos, Barnes, and Lin
1996), and humankind’s relationship with animals has played a key
role in each of these “epidemiological transitions.”
The first period started ten thousand years ago with the domestica-

tion of animals. When human
beings confined animals to a barnyard, we corralled their diseases
with them. They were not just any
diseases. Species that have a herd
instinct are the easiest to domesticate. Unfortunately such animals
also evolved epidemic diseases that
can exploit their large, dense numbers. Archeological evidence suggests that humans, on the other
hand, evolved in tight hunter/gatherer bands too small to support epidemics and, as such, hardly suffered from contagious disease at all
(Torrey and Yolken 2005a). Then
human beings became herders,
triggering what the director of
Harvard University’s Center for
Health and the Global Environment
called the mass “spillover” of animal disease into human populations (Epstein, Chivian, and Frith
2003). The World Health Organization (WHO) defined the term
“zoonoses” to describe this phenomenon (Mantovani 2001), from
the Greek zoion for “animal” and
nosos for “disease.”
Humanity’s biblical “dominion
over the fish of the sea and over the
birds of heaven; and every living
thing that moved upon the earth”
has unleashed a veritable Pandora’s
ark full of humankind’s greatest
killers. Human beings domesticated

goats, and they, in turn, may have
given human beings tuberculosis
(Espinosa de los Monteros et al.
1998). This “captain of all these
men of death” (Dubos and Dubos
1952, 8) in the last century alone
killed about one hundred million
people (Torrey and Yolken 2005b)
and is today killing more people
than ever (Reichman and Hopkins
2001). A disease that may have
started out in goats now infects
one-third of humanity (WHO 2000).
Tuberculosis is jumping species
to this day. In a 2000 study, doctors tested children with tuberculosis in San Diego and found that
one-third of the tuberculosis cases
weren’t human tuberculosis. They
were bovine tuberculosis, caught,
the researchers suspect, from
drinking inadequately pasteurized
m i l k f r o m a n i n f e c t e d c o w.
The investigators conclude,
“These data demonstrate the dramatic impact of this underappreciated cause of zoonotic TB on
U.S. children....” (Dankner and
Davis 2000, E79).
When human beings first domesticated cattle, we also domesticated their rinderpest virus, which
is thought to have turned into
human measles (Daszak and Cunningham 2002). Now regarded as a
relatively benign disease, measles
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has killed two hundred million
people worldwide over the last
150
years
( To r r e y
and
Yo l k e n 2005b). In a sense, all
those deaths can ultimately be
traced backed a few hundred generations to the taming of the first
cow or bull (Diamond 1992).
Smallpox may also have been
caused by a mutant cattle virus
(McMichael 2001). Human beings
domesticated pigs, and the result
was whooping cough; we domesticated chickens and got typhoid
fever; and we domesticated ducks
and got influenza (Torrey and
Yolken 2005b). Before then, it is
likely that no one ever got the flu.
Leprosy likely came from water
buffalo, and the cold virus from
horses (McMichael 2001). How
often did wild horses have the
opportunity to sneeze into humanity’s face until they were broken
and bridled? Before then the common cold was presumably common
only to them.
Diamond (1997) explains how
barnyard diseases decimated 95
percent of Native Americans, who
had never before been exposed to
diseases like tuberculosis, measles,
and smallpox. Before Europeans
arrived, bringing their goats with
them, tuberculosis didn’t exist in
the Americas. There were no
domesticated buffalo, so there was
no measles or smallpox. There
were no pigs, so no pertussis; no
chickens, so no Typhoid Mar ys.
While people in Europe and Asia
died by the millions of killer
scourges, none was dying in the
New World because there were no
farm animals to domesticate (Diamond 1997).
Such events aren’t confined to
centuries past. New diseases from
domesticated farm animals continue to be discovered. H. pylori, a
bacteria living in the human stomach, causes stomach cancer and
the vast majority of peptic ulcers
worldwide (De Groote, Ducatelle,
and Haesebrouck 2000). Roughly
half of the world’s population is
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now infected with it (Suerbaum
and Michetti 2002). This ulcercausing bacterium is thought to
have originated in sheep’s milk,
but is now spread person-to-person. What is now probably the
most common chronic infection
afflicting humanity (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention
2005) came about because we
decided thousands of years ago to
start drinking the milk of another
species (Dore et al. 2001).
H. pylori is not an isolated find.
H. pullorum, a cousin of H. pylori,
is a bacterium found in chicken
meat. Hepatitis E, a new hepatitis
virus that can kill pregnant
women, has been found to be rampant in North American pork operations (Yoo et al. 2001). Unlike a
disease like trichinosis, which only
affects those who actually consume
undercooked pork, once hepatitis
E crosses the species line, it can be
spread person-to-person. One may
not have eaten infected pork, but
the person from whom one got a
blood transfusion may have.

The Second
Age of Disease
The second great era of human disease started with the Industrial
Revolution of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, when an epidemic of the so-called diseases of
civilization, such as cancer, heart
disease, stroke, and diabetes,
began. These chronic diseases,
considered largely preventable
through changes in diet and
lifestyle, now account for seven of
ten deaths in the United States
and the majority of deaths worldwide (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2006a). Interestingly, our domestication of animals
also plays a role.
In 2004 WHO published its longawaited Global Strategy on Diet,
Physical Activity, and Health, unanimously endorsed by the United
Nations’ 192 member countries.

WHO is considered one of the
world’s most reputable sources of
nutrition information because it
is seen as less beholden to the
multitrillion-dollar food industry
than government agencies can be.
(For example, U.S. government recommendations, allegedly at the
sugar industry’s behest, have long
allowed added refined sugar
to make up an astounding 25 percent of our daily caloric intake
[Doyle 2003]).
WHO blames the growing epidemic of global chronic disease in
part on “greater saturated fat
intake (mostly from animal
sources), reduced intakes of complex carbohydrates and dietary
fiber, and reduced fruit and vegetable intakes.” As such, it is calling for limiting the consumption
of saturated animal fat and “increasing the consumption of fruits,
vegetables, legumes [beans, peas,
and lentils], whole grains, and
nuts” (World Health Organization
2003, n.p.).
Barnard, Nicholson, and Howard
(1995) estimate that meat consumption may account for up to
one-quarter of the cases of heart
disease in the United States, onethird of the diabetes, maybe four
out of ten common cancers, half of
the obesity, two-thirds of the
nation’s high blood pressure, and
as many as three-fourths of all gallbladder operations.
M. Nestle, one of world’s most
highly respected nutrition experts,
former director of nutrition policy
at the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, and longtime
chairwoman of the nutrition department at New York University,
has said, “The evidence is so strong
and overwhelming and produced
over such a long period of time
that it is no longer debatable....
There is no question that largely
vegetarian diets are as healthy as
you can get” (in Liebman 1996,
n.p.). The fewer animals in the
human diet and the more healthy
plant foods—the WHO’s “fruits,
The State of the Animals IV: 2007

vegetables, beans, whole grains,
and nuts”—the lower the risk of
developing many chronic diseases
(WHO 2003, n.p.).

The Third
Age of Disease
By the mid-twentieth centur y,
humankind had developed penicillin, conquered polio, and eradicated smallpox. The age of infectious disease was thought to be
over. Indeed, in 1948 the U.S. secretary of state pronounced that the
conquest of all infectious diseases
was imminent (Najera 1989).
Twenty years later the U.S. surgeon
general declared victory: “The war
against diseases has been won”
(Crawford 2000). Even Nobel laureates were seduced into the heady
optimism. To write about infectious
disease, one Nobel-winning virologist wrote in the 1962 text Natural
History of Infectious Disease, “is
almost to write of something that
has passed into history.” “[T]he
most likely forecast about the
future of infectious disease,” he
pronounced, “is that it will be very
dull” (Burnet and White 1962).
Then something changed. After
years of declining infectious disease mortality in the United States,
the last three decades have seen
a reversal in that trend (Gill,
Rechtschaffen, and Rubenstein
2000): the number of Americans
dying from infectious diseases has
started going back up (Cohen and
Larson 1996). Beginning in approximately 1975 (National Agricultural Research, Extension, Education, and Economics 2004), new
diseases started to surface at a pace
unheard of in the annals of medicine (Epstein, Chivian, and Frith
2003)—more than thirty new diseases in thirty years, most of them
newly discovered viruses (Woolhouse 2002). The concept of
“emerging infectious diseases” has
now changed from a mere curiosity
in the field of medicine to an entire

discipline that has moved to center
stage (Brown 2000). We may soon
be facing, according to the Institute of Medicine, a “catastrophic
storm of microbial threats” (Weinhold 2004).
We are currently living in the
t h i rd e r a o f h u m a n d i s e a s e ,
described by medical historians as
the age of “the emerging plagues”
(Glasser 2004). Never in medical
history have so many new diseases
appeared in so short a time—and
almost all of them have entered the
human population from animals.
Animals were domesticated ten
thousand years ago: what has
changed in recent decades to bring
this sobering reality upon us?
Human beings have been changing the way animals live. One example: during World War II, when leading cattle-producing nations were at
war, Argentina took advantage of
the situation by dramatically expanding its beef industry at the
expense of its forests. There human
beings discovered the deadly Junin
virus (or, more accurately, it discovered human beings), which is now
known as the cause of Argentine
hemorrhagic fever. This “hamburgerization” of the rainforests subsequently played a role in uncovering
the Machupo virus in Bolivia, the
Sabia virus in Brazil, and the
Venezuelan hemorrhagic fever virus
in Venezuela (Hoff and Smith 2000).
Deforestation also contributes
to global warming. The millions of
cattle and other farm animals, and
the billions of tons of their
manure, are primary global contributors of the greenhouse gas
methane (Mossa, Jouanyb, and
Newbold 2000), which also plays a
significant role in climate change
(Ramanujan 2005). The warming
trend could dramatically expand
the reach of insect-borne diseases
like the West Nile virus. According
to an international panel of experts, if the average world temperature were to increase by three
degrees, the zone in which malaria
is spread would expand from 45

percent of the world’s population
to 60 percent (Nolen 2005), causing fifty to eighty million new cases
of malaria (Stapp 2004).
Inroads into Africa’s rainforests
have blazed trails on which other
hemorrhagic fever viruses escaped
—the Lassa virus, Rift Valley Fever,
and Ebola. “These zoonotic viruses
seem to adhere to the philosophy
that says, ‘I won’t bother you if you
don’t bother me,’” (Culliton 1990,
279). But as people began “pushing back forests, or engaging in
agricultural practices that are ecologically congenial to viruses, the
viruses could make their way into
the human population and multiply
and spread” (Culliton 1990, 279).
Radical alterations of forest
ecosystems can be—indeed, are—
hazardous, whether in the Amazon
Basin or the woods of Connecticut.
Lyme disease was first recognized in
New England’s forests in 1975 and
has since moved across all fifty
states (Dryden’s Grant Information
2005), affecting an estimated hundred thousand Americans (National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases 2000). Lyme disease is
spread by bacteria-infested ticks
who live on deer and mice, animals
with whom people have always
shared wooded areas. Suburban
sprawl in recent decades has
chopped America’s woods into subdivisions, scaring away the foxes and
bobcats who had previously kept
mouse populations in check.
Cookie-cutter subdivisions weren’t
the reason Africa’s rainforests were
cut down. Rather, transnational
timber corporations, hacking logging roads deep into the remotest
regions of the continent, paved the
way for a mass human migration
into the rainforests to set up concessions to support the commercial logging operations. One of the
main sources of food for these
migrant workers is bushmeat—
wild animals killed for food (Walters 2003), including upwards of
twenty-six different species of primates (Avasthi 2004). Thousands
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of endangered great apes—gorillas
and chimpanzees—are shot,
butchered, smoked, and sold for
human consumption (Rose 1996).
To support the logging industry’s
infrastructure (Rose 1998), a veritable army of commercial bushmeat hunters is bringing the
great apes to the brink of extinction (Walsh et al. 2003). “These
logging companies have been promoting the bushmeat trade themselves,” says Fox (2000, n.p.). “It is
easier to hand out shotgun shells
than to truck in beef” (Fox 2000).
By cannibalizing fellow primates,
human beings are exposing themselves to pathogens particularly finetuned to human primate physiology.
Recent human outbreaks of Ebola,
for example, have been traced to
exposure to the dead bodies of infected great apes hunted for food
(Karesh et al. 2005). Ebola, one of
humanity’s deadliest infections, is
not efficiently spread, though, compared to a virus like human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
The leading theory about the
emergence of HIV is “direct exposure to animal blood and secretions
as a result of hunting, butchering,
or other activities (such as consumption of uncooked contaminated meat)” (Hahn et al. 2000).
Experts believe the most likely scen a r i o i s t h a t H I V a ro s e f ro m
humans sawing their way into the
forests of west equatorial Africa on
logging expeditions, butchering
chimpanzees for their flesh along
the way (Laurance 2004).
In some countries the prevalence of HIV now exceeds 25 percent of the adult population (Davis
and Lederberg 2001), leaving millions of orphaned children in its
wake (United Nations 2004). Five
people die from AIDS every minute
(Lamptey et al. 2002). The most
current thinking leads one to
believe that, because someone
butchered a chimp a few decades
ago, twenty million people are now
dead (National AIDS Trust 2005).
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Wild animals have been hunted
for a hundred thousand years, but
at nothing like the current rate.
Growing human populations and
increasing demand for wildlife
meat exceed local populations of
affected species (Karesh et al.
2005). This has resulted in an
enormous (and largely illegal)
transboundary trade of wildlife and
the setting up of intensive captive
production farms in which wild animals are raised, often subjected to
poor sanitation, in unnatural
stocking densities before being
packed together into markets for
sale. These factors favor the spread
and emergence of mutant strains
of pathogens capable of infecting
hunters, farmers, and grocery
shoppers (Gilbert, Wint, and Slingenbergh 2004). Live-animal markets have been described by the
director of the Wildlife Conservation Society as veritable human
and animal “disease factories”
(Lawrie 2004). These viral swap
meets are blamed for the transformation of a class of viruses previously known for causing the common cold into a killer named SARS
(Lee and Krilov 2005).
The intensive commercial bushmeat trade started in the live-animal
markets of Asia (Bell, Roberton, and
Hunter 2004), particularly in
Guangdong, the southern province
surrounding Hong Kong from which
the deadly avian influenza strain
H5N1 arose (Chen et al. 2004). Literature from the Southern Song
Dynasty (1127–1279) describes the
residents of Guangdong eating
“whatever food, be it birds, animals,
worms, or snakes” (Jun 2004).
Today, live-animal markets cater to
the unique tastes of the people of
Guangdong, where shoppers can
savor “Dragon-Tiger-Phoenix Soup,”
a brew made of snake, cat, and
chicken (Bray 2005) or delicacies
like san jiao, or “three screams”—
the wriggling baby rat is said to
scream first when hefted with chopsticks, a second time when dipped

into vinegar, and a third time as she
or he is bitten into (Lynch 2003).
In China animals are eaten for
enjoyment, sustenance, and their
purported medicinal qualities.
There are reports of dogs being
“savagely beaten before death to
increase their aphrodisiac properties” (Lawrie 2004). Cats are killed
and boiled down into “cat juice,”
used to treat arthritis. Many of the
cats are captured ferals in ill health,
so “consuming such diseased cats is
a time bomb waiting to explode,”
claimed the chief veterinarian of
the Australian RSPCA.
The cat-like masked palm civet
has been a popular commodity in
Chinese animal markets (Brummitt
2004). Civets are raised for their
flesh, and the civet cat penis is
soaked in rice wine for use as an
aphrodisiac (Bell, Roberton, and
Hunter 2004). These animals also
produce the most expensive coffee
in the world (Kasper n.d.). So-called
fox-dung coffee is produced by feeding coffee beans to captive civets
and then recovering the partially
digested beans from the feces (Marshall 1999). A musk-like substance
of buttery consistency secreted by
the anal glands gives the coffee its
characteristic flavor and smell
(William 2003).
The masked palm civet has been
blamed for the SARS epidemic (Lee
and Krilov 2005). “A culinary choice
in south China,” one commentator
summed up in Lancet, “led to a
fatal infection in Hong Kong, and
subsequently to 8,000 cases of
severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), and nearly 1,000 deaths in
thirty countries on six continents”
(Mack 2005). Ironically, one reason
civets are eaten is for protection
from respiratory infections (Davis
2005c). As noted in The China
Daily, “We kill them. We eat them.
And, then, we blame them” (Ming
2004, n.p.).
Viruses can escape the rain forests
in animals living or dead, as pets or
as meat. The international trade in
exotic pets is a multibillion-dollar
The State of the Animals IV: 2007

industry, and exotic pets can harbor
exotic germs (Avasthi 2004).
Wildlife trafficking—the illegal
trade in wildlife and wildlife parts—
is a soaring black market worth $10
billion a year in the United States
alone (U.S. Department of State
2005). The United States imports
an unbelievable 350,000 different
species of live animals. The deputy
director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service testified before a
Senate committee in 2003 that the
United States imports more than
200 million fish, 49 million amphibians, 2 million reptiles, 365,000
birds, and 38,000 mammals in a single year (Weinhold 2004).
Whether for exotic pets or exotic
cuisine, imported animals transported together under cramped
conditions end up in holding areas
in dealer warehouses, where they—
and their viruses—can mingle further. The 2003 monkeypox outbreak
across half a dozen states in the Midwest was traced to monkeypox-infected Gambian giant rats shipped
to a Texas animal distributor, along
with eight hundred other small
mammals snared from the African
rain forest. The rodents were housed
with prairie dogs, who contracted
the disease and made their way into
pet stores and swap meets via an Illinois distributor. One week the virus
is in a rodent in the dense jungles of
Ghana, along the Gold Coast of
West Africa—a few weeks later, that
same virus finds itself in a three-yearold Wisconsin girl whose mother
bought her a little prairie dog at a
4-H swap meet. “Basically you factored out an ocean and half a continent by moving these animals
around and ultimately juxtaposing
them in a warehouse or a garage
somewhere,” said Wisconsin’s chief
epidemiologist (Marchione 2003).
As one expert quipped, “It was probably easier for a Gambian rat to get
into the United States than [it was
for] a Gambian” (Marchione 2003).
Bird smuggling may actually have
been what brought the West Nile
virus to the Western hemisphere

(Johnson 2003). West Nile hit New
York in 1999 and has since spread
across forty-eight states and Canada
(Stapp 2004), with thousands of
cases in 2005 and more than a hundred deaths (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention 2006b). Its
continued expansion suggests that
the virus has become permanently
established in the United States,
all, perhaps, because of a single, illegally imported pet bird (Ludwig et
al. 2003).
This movement of disease agents
can also threaten wildlife. The
greatest animal plague ever
recorded was the “Great Rinderpest
Pandemic” at the end of the nineteenth century. The use of cattle by
the Italian army to pull gun carriages into sub-Saharan Africa is
thought to have triggered the outbreak of rinderpest, a measles-like
disease of cloven-hoofed animals
that wiped out not only up to 95
percent of cattle in some countries
(Waltner-Toews 2002), but also up
to 90 percent of other large ungulate species such as African buffalo
and giraffe (Alfonso 1999). Societies based on the cattle economy
were devastated. As one Masai man
described, the corpses of cattle and
people were “so many and so close
together that the vultures had forgotten how to fly” (Plowright
1982). No longer can natural barriers like the Saharan desert protect
populations against the spread of
epidemic disease.
A contemporary example is an
emerging fungal disease discovered
in 1998 (Williams et al. 2002) that
causes massive die-offs and even
extinctions of amphibian wildlife
across five continents (Williams et
al. 2002). Ecologists now suspect
the international restaurant trade
in the North American bullfrog (for
its fleshy legs) may have played a
key role in global dissemination of
this disease (Ginsburg 2004).
According to WHO’s coordinator
for zoonoses control, “The chief
risk factor for emerging zoonotic
diseases is environmental degrada-

tion by humans.” This includes
degradation wrought by global climate change, deforestation, and, as
described by WHO, “industrialization and intensification of the animal production sector” (WHO and
Office International des Epizooties
1999, n.p).
In 2005 China, the world’s largest
producer of pork (RaboBank International 2003), suffered an unprecedented outbreak in scope and lethality of Streptococcus suis, a newly
emerging zoonotic pig pathogen
(Gosline 2005). Strep. suis is a common cause of meningitis in intensively farmed pigs worldwide (Merck
Veterinary Manual, n.p.) and presents most often as meningitis in
people as well (Huang et al. 2005),
particularly those who butcher
infected pigs or handle infected
pork products (Gosline 2005). Due
to involvement of the auditory
nerves connecting the inner ears to
the brain, half of the disease’s
human survivors are rendered deaf
(Altman 2005).
WHO reported that it had never
seen so virulent a strain (Nolan
2005) and blamed intensive confinement conditions as a predisposing factor in its sudden emergence,
given the stress-induced suppression of the pigs’ immune systems
(WHO 2005). The U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) explains
that these bacteria can exist as a
harmless component of a pig’s normal bacterial flora, but stress due
to factors like crowding and poor
ventilation can drop the animal’s
defenses long enough for the bacteria to become invasive and cause
disease (USDA 2005b). China’s
assistant minister of commerce
admitted that the disease was
“found to have direct links with
the foul environment for raising
pigs” (China View 2005, n.p.).
The disease can spread through
respiratory droplets or directly via
contact with contaminated blood
on improperly sterilized castration
scalpels, tooth-cutting pliers, or
tail-docking knives (Du 2005).
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China boasts an estimated fourteen
thousand concentrated animalfeeding operations (C AFOs)
(Nierenberg 2005), colloquially
known as factory farms, which
tend to have stocking densities conducive to the emergence and spread
of disease (Arends et al. 1984).
The United States is the world’s
second-largest pork producer (FAOSTAT Database 2005), and Strep.
suis infection is also an emerging
pathogen in North America pig production, especially in intensive confinement settings (Du 2005).
According to The Journal of Swine
Health and Production, human cases
of meningitis in North America are
likely underdiagnosed and misidentified (Gottschalk 2004) due to the
lack of adequate surveillance (Cole,
Todd, and Wing 2000). WHO encourages careful pork preparation
(WHO 2005), and North American
agriculture officials urge Strep. suis
disease awareness for people “who
work in pig barns, processing plants,
as well as in the home kitchen”
(Du 2005, n.p.).
The first human case of Strep.
suis was not in Asia or in the
United States, but in Europe. The
Dutch pig belt, extending into
parts of neighboring Belgium and
Germany, has the densest population of pigs in the world, more than
twenty thousand per square mile.
This region has been hit in recent
years with major epidemics of hog
cholera and foot and mouth disease, leading to the destruction of
millions of animals. “With more
and more pigs being raised intensively to satisfy Europe’s lust for
cheap pork, epidemics are inevitable,” wrote MacKenzie (1998,
n.p.). “And the hogs may not be the
only ones to get sick.”
This Strep. suis outbreak followed years after the emergence
of the Nipah virus on an intensive
industrial pig farm in Malaysia.
Nipah turned out to be one of the
deadliest of human pathogens,
killing 40 percent of those infected,
a toll that propelled it onto the U.S.
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list of potential bioterrorism agents
(Fritsch 2003). This virus is also
noted for its “intriguing ability” to
cause relapsing brain infections in
some survivors (Wong et al. 2002)
many months after initial exposure
(Wong et al. 2001). Even more concerning, a 2004 resurgence of
Nipah virus in Bangladesh showed a
case fatality rate on a par with
Ebola—75 percent—and showed
evidence of human-to-human transmission (Harcourt et al. 2004). The
Nipah virus, like all contagious respiratory diseases, is a density-dependent pathogen (U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency 2006). “Without these large, intensively managed pig farms in Malaysia,” the
director of the Consortium for Conservation Medicine said, “it would
have been extremely difficult for
the virus to emerge” (Nierenberg
2005, 44).
Even industry groups like the
American Association of Swine Veterinarians cite “[e]merging livestock production systems, particularly where they involve increased
intensification” as a main reason
why zoonotic diseases are of increasing concern. These intensive
systems, in addition to their high
population density, “may also generate pathogen build-ups or impair
the capacity of animals to withstand
infectious agents” (Meredith 2004,
n.p.). Increasing consumer demand
for animal products worldwide over
the past few decades has led to a
global explosion in massive animal
agriculture operations that have
come to play a key role in the third
age of emerging human disease
(McMichael 2004).
Whether it be from E. coli
O157:H7 in hamburgers, antibioticresistant Salmonella in eggs, Listeria in hot dogs, “flesh-eating” bacteria in oysters, or Campylobacter
in chickens and Thanksgiving
turkeys, the CDC estimates that
seventy-six million Americans come
down with foodborne illness every
year (Mead et al. 1999). In the
twenty years between 1975 (around

the time when the dean of Yale’s
School of Medicine famously told
students that there were “no new
diseases to be discovered”) and
1995, seventeen foodborne pathogens emerged, almost one each year
(Liang 2002). According to the
executive editor of Meat Processing
magazine, “Nearly every food consumers buy in supermarkets and
order in restaurants can be eaten
with certainty for its safety—except
for meat and poultry products”
(Bjerklie 1999).
Animals were domesticated ten
thousand years ago. With billions of
feathered and curly-tailed test-tubes
for viruses to incubate and mutate
within, a WHO official described the
last few decades as “the most ambitious short-term experiment in evolution in the history of the world”
(Cookson 1993, n.p.).
Global public health experts have
identified specific “dubious practices used in modern animal husbandry” beyond the inherent overstocking, stress, and unhygienic
conditions that have directly or
indirectly launched deadly new diseases (Phua and Lee 2005). One
such “misguided” brave new farm
practice is the continued feeding of
livestock slaughterhouse waste,
blood, and excrement to save on
feed costs (Stapp 2004).
Feed expenditures remain the
single largest industry expense
(Lawrence and Otto 2006). The
livestock industr y has experimented with feeding newspaper,
cardboard, cement dust, and sewer
sludge to farm animals (Rampton
and Stauber 1997). Satchell and
Hedges (1997, n.p.) report: “Cattle
feed now contains things like
manure and dead cats.” The Animal Industry Association (1989)
defends these practices, arguing
that the average U.S. farm animal
“eats better than the average U.S.
citizen.” Forcing natural herbivores
like cows, sheep, and other animals
to be carnivores and even cannibals
has turned out to have serious public health implications.
The State of the Animals IV: 2007

A leading theory on the origin of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(or “mad cow disease”) is that
cows got it by eating diseased
sheep (Kimberlin 1992). In modern corporate agribusiness, protein
concentrates (or “meat and bone
meal,” euphemistic descriptions of
“trimmings that originate on the
killing floor, inedible parts and
organs, cleaned entrails, fetuses”
[Ensminger 1990]) are fed to dairy
cows to increase milk production
(Flaherty 1993) as well as to most
other livestock (The Economist
1990). Nearly ten million metric
tons of slaughterhouse waste is fed
to livestock every year (WHO and
Office International des Epizooties
1999). Recycling the remains of
infected cattle into cattle feed was
probably what led to the British
mad cow epidemic’s explosive
spread (Collee 1993) to nearly two
dozen countries around the world
in the subsequent twenty years
(USDA 2005a). Dairy producers
can use corn or soybeans as a protein feed supplement, but slaughterhouse by-products can be
cheaper (Albert 2000).
The meat industr y has long
known that cannibalistic feeding
practices could have human health
consequences, as Salmonella epidemics in poultry linked to the recycling of animal remains back into
animal feed had been described well
before the mad cow disease epidemic (Waltner-Toews 2002). Despite the known potential hazards
to humans, the meat industry remains opposed to a total ban on
feeding slaughterhouse waste,
blood, and excrement to farm animals (Murphy 2003).
In 2004 the Worldwatch Institute
(2004) published Meat: Now, It’s
Not Personal, whose title alludes to
intensive methods of production
that have placed all human beings
at risk, regardless of what they eat.
In the age of antibiotic resistance,
which has been fueled by the industrial feeding of antibiotics to farm
animals to promote growth, a sim-

ple scrape can turn into a mortal
wound, and a simple surgical procedure can be anything but simple. At
least these “superbugs” are not
effectively spread from person to
person. Given the propensity of
industrial animal agriculture to
churn out novel lethal pathogens,
what if they produced a virus capable of a global pandemic?

Last Great Plague
The dozens of emerging zoonotic
disease threats that have characterized this third era of human disease
must be put into context. Strep.
suis infected scores of human
beings and killed dozens. Nipah infected hundreds and killed scores.
SARS infected thousands and killed
hundreds. AIDS has infected millions. Only one virus we know of can
infect billions—influenza.
Influenza, the “last great plague
of man” (Kaplan and Webster
1977), is the only known pathogen
capable of truly global catastrophe
(Silverstein 1981). Unlike other
devastating infections like malaria,
which is confined equatorially, or
HIV, which is only fluid-borne,
influenza is considered by the
CDC’s K. Fukuda to be the only
pathogen carrying the potential to
“infect a huge percentage of the
world’s population inside the space
of a year” (in Davies 1999, n.p.).
Because of its extreme mutation
rate, influenza is a perpetually
emerging disease. A. Fauci, NIH’s
pandemic planning czar, calls it
“the mother of all emerging infections” (Davis 2005b, n.p.). In its
4,500 years of infecting humans
since the first domestication of
wild birds, influenza has always
been one of the most contagious
pathogens (Taylor 2005). Only
since 1997 has it also emerged as
one of the deadliest.
H5N1, the new killer strain of
avian influenza spreading out of
Asia, had only killed about a hundred people by mid-2006 (WHO
2006). In a world in which millions

die of diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS, why is there so
much concern about bird flu? The
answer is, because the flu has killed
before. An influenza pandemic in
1918 became the deadliest plague
in human history, killing up to a
hundred million people around the
world (Johnson and Mueller 2002).
The 1918 flu virus was likely a bird
flu virus (Belshe 2005); that virus
made more than a quarter of all
Americans ill and killed more people in twenty-five weeks than AIDS
has killed in twenty-five years
(Barry 2004). In 1918 the case
mortality rate was less than 5 percent (Frist 2005). H5N1 has so far
officially killed half of its human victims (WHO 2006).
H5N1 took its first human life in
Hong Kong in 1997 (Davies 1999)
and has since rampaged west to Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Europe (Lancet Infectious Diseases
2006). It remains almost exclusively
a disease of birds, but as the virus has
spread, it has continued to mutate.
It has become more lethal and more
environmentally stable and has
begun taking more species under its
wing (Stöhr 2005). Influenza viruses
don’t typically kill mammals like
rodents, but experiments have
shown that the latest H5N1 mutants
can kill 100 percent of infected
mice, practically dissolving their
lungs (Garrett 2005). “This is the
most pathogenic virus that we know
of,” declared one lead investigator.
“One infectious particle—one single
infectious virion—kills mice. Amazing virus” (Drexler 2002, 180).
The virus also started killing cats,
both pets (WHO 2004) and tigers
and leopards in zoos (Keawcharoen
et al. 2004). Before H5N1 no
influenza virus was known even to
make felines sick (Kuiken et al.
2004). According to WHO (2004,
n.p.), “The reported infection of
domestic cats with H5N1 is an unusual event in what is an historically unprecedented situation.”
Currently in humans H5N1 is
good at killing, but not at spread-
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ing. Three essential conditions are
necessary to produce a pandemic.
• A new virus must arise from an
animal reservoir, such that
humans have no natural immunity to it.
• The virus must evolve to be
capable of killing human beings
efficiently. (H5N1 has met
these first two conditions.)
• The virus must succeed in
jumping efficiently from one
human to the next. (For H5N1
it’s one small step to man, but
one giant leap to mankind!)
If the bird flu virus triggers a
human pandemic, it will not be
peasant farmers in Vietnam dying
after handling dead birds or raw
poultry—it may be New Yorkers,
Parisians, Londoners, and people
in every city, township, and village
in the world dying after shaking
someone’s hand, touching a doorknob, or simply inhaling in the
wrong place at the wrong time.
Mathematical models suggest
that it might be possible to snuff
out an emerging flu pandemic at
the source if caught early enough
(Ferguson et al. 2005; Longini et
al. 2005), but practical considerations may render this an impossibility (Center for Infectious Disease
and Research Policy 2005). Even if
we were able to stamp it out, as
long as the same underlying conditions remain, the virus would presumably soon pop back up again as
it has in the past (Heiberg 2005).
The current dialogue surrounding avian influenza speaks of a
potential H5N1 pandemic as if it
were a natural phenomenon—like
hurricanes, earthquakes, or even a
“viral asteroid on a collision course
with humanity ” (Davis 2005a,
n.p.)—which human beings could
not hope to control. The reality,
however, is that the next pandemic
may be more of an unnatural disaster of our own design.
Bird flu in chickens has gone
from an exceedingly rare disease to
one that crops up every year. The
number of serious outbreaks in the
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first few years of the twenty-first
century has already exceeded the
total number of outbreaks
recorded for the entire twentieth
century. As a leading flu scientist
told Science, “We’ve gone from a
few snowflakes to an avalanche”
(Enserink 2005, 341).
The increase in chicken outbreaks
has gone hand-in-hand with more
transmission to humans. A decade
ago, human infection with bird flu
was essentially unheard of. Since
H5N1 emerged in 1997, chicken
viruses H9N2 infected children in
China in 1999 and 2003, H7N2 infected residents of New York and Virginia in 2002 and 2003, H7N7
infected people in the Netherlands
in 2003, and H7N3 infected poultry
workers in Canada in 2004 (Enserink 2005) and a British farmer in
2006. The bird flu virus in the
Netherlands outbreak infected more
than a thousand people (Enserink
2005). To slow down or stop this
sudden, rapid, recent emergence of
highly pathogenic flu viruses,
humane beings must understand
what has triggered this “avalanche”
in the first place.
Free-ranging flocks and wild
birds have been blamed for the
recent emergence of H5N1, but
people have kept chickens in their
backyards for thousands of years,
and birds have been migrating for
millions. What has changed in
recent years that led us to this current crisis? At a November 2005
Council on Foreign Relations Conference on the Global Threat of
Pandemic Influenza, the senior
correspondent of the PBS television program The NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer, R. Suarez, asked such a
question of the “godfather of flu
research” (Council on Foreign
Relations 2005), R. Webster.
SUAREZ: Was there something
qualitatively different about
this last decade that made it
possible for this disease to do
something that it either hasn’t
done before...a change in conditions that suddenly lit

a match to the tinder?
WEBSTER: [F]arming practices have changed. Previously,
we had backyard poultry....Now
we put millions of chickens
into a chicken factory next
door to a pig factory, and this
virus has the opportunity to
get into one of these chicken
factories and make billions and
billions of these mutations
continuously. And so what
we’ve changed is the way we
raise animals and our interaction with those animals. And
so the virus is changing in
those animals and now finding
its way back out of those animals into the wild birds. That’s
what’s changed. (Council on
Foreign Relations 2005, n.p.)
The big change in the ecology of
avian influenza has been the industrialization of the global poultry
sector. Over the last few decades,
meat and egg consumption has
exploded in the developing world
(Kazmin 2004), leading to industrial-scale commercial chicken
farming, the perfect environment
for the emergence and spread of
new superstrains of influenza.
When tens of thousands of animals
are crammed into filthy, footballfield-size sheds to stand beak-tobeak in their own manure, human
beings are asking for trouble.
WHO in part blames the emergence of deadly Asian viruses—such
as H5N1, SARS, and Nipah—on the
“over-consumption of animal products” and intensive animal agriculture (Oshitani, n.d.). The World
Organization for Animal Health
blames in part the shorter production cycles and greater animal densities of modern poultry production, which result in “greater
number of susceptible animals
reared per given unit of time”
(Capua and Marangon 2003, n.p.).
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) notes that
[T]here seems to be an acceleration of the human influenza
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problems over the last few
decades, involving an increasing number of species, and this
is expected to largely relate to
intensification of the poultry
(and possibly pig) production.
(Gilbert, Wint, and Slingenbergh 2004, n.p.)
The FAO elaborates in an internal document:
[C]hicken-to-chicken spread,
particularly where assisted by
intensive husbandr y conditions, promotes the virus to
shift (adaptation) to more
severe type (highly pathogenic
type) of infection.... Intensive
production conditions favor
rapid spread of infection within
units and “hotting-up” of virus
from low pathogenicity to a
highly pathogenic types. (FAO
2004, n.p.)
The United Nations specifically
calls on governments to fight what
it calls factory farming:
Governments, local authorities, and international agencies need to take a greatly
increased role in combating
the role of factory farming
[which combined with live bird
markets] provide[s] ideal conditions for the virus to spread
and mutate into a more dangerous form. (United Nations
2005, n.p.)
All bird flu viruses seem to start
out harmless to both birds and
people. In its natural state, the
influenza virus has existed for millions of years as an innocuous,
intestinal, waterborne infection of
aquatic birds such as ducks (Webster et al. 1992). How does a
duck’s intestinal bug end up in a
human cough?
In the viruses’ natural aquatic
bird reservoir, the duck doesn’t get
sick, because the virus doesn’t need
to make the duck sick to spread. In
fact, it’s in the virus’s best interest
for the bird not to get sick so as to
spread farther. After all, dead ducks
don’t fly. The virus silently multiplies in the duck’s intestinal lining

to be excreted into the pond water
and then swallowed by another
duck who alights for a drink; the
cycle continues as it has for millions of years, and no one gets hurt.
If, for example, an infected duck
is dragged to a live poultry market,
though, and crammed into a cage
stacked high enough to splatter
virus-laden droppings over many
different species of land-based
birds, the virus then has a problem.
No longer can the virus rely on the
ease of pond water spread: it must
mutate or die (Shortridge 1992).
Thankfully for the virus, mutating
is what influenza viruses do best
(Suarez 2000). In aquatic birds the
virus is perfectly adapted in total
evolutionary stasis (Webster 1998),
but, when thrown into a new environment—land-based birds like
chickens—it quickly starts mutating to adapt to the new host
(Suarez et al. 1998). In the open
air, it must resist dehydration
(Dronamraju 2004), for example,
and may spread to other organs to
find a new way to travel. Sometimes
it finds the lungs.
The more virulent the virus becomes, the quicker it may be able to
overwhelm the immune system of
its new victims (Van Blerkom 2003),
but it must take care not to become
too deadly. In an outdoor setting, if
the virus kills the host too quickly,
the animal may be dead before it has
a chance to infect another. So
there’s a limit to how virulent these
viruses can get (Dimmock, Easton,
and Leppard 2001)—or at least
there was until now.
Enter intensive poultry production.
When the next beak is inches
away, there may be fewer limits to
how nasty the virus can get. Evolutionary biologists believe that this
is the key to the emergence of
so-called predator-like (McGirk,
Adiga, and Glacier 2005) viruses
like H5N1—disease transmission
from immobilized hosts (Ewald
1994). When you have a situation
where the healthy animals can’t
escape the diseased, then there

may be no stopping rapidly mutating viruses from becoming truly
ferocious (Rennie 2005).
This may have been what
occurred in the crowded trenches,
troop transports, and army camps
of World War I leading up to the
1918 pandemic. Boxcar capacity
was labeled “eight horses or forty
men” (Byerly 2005, 94). Millions of
people were forced into close quarters where there was no escaping a
sick comrade. This may have been
where the flu virus of 1918 gained
its virulence (Byerly 2005).
From the virus’s point of view,
these same trench warfare conditions exist today in every industrial
chicken shed. Birds are intensively
confined, crowded, and stressed,
not just by the millions but by the
billions. Mabbett (2005, 34) offers
a concise explanation of the role of
large-scale poultry production:
The AI virus lives harmlessly in
the ducks popular in Asia to
control insect pests and snails
in rice paddies. If this duck
’flu passes to chickens kept
nearby, it can mutate into a
deadly and highly contagious
strain that speeds rapidly with
accompanying high mortality.
The larger the flocks and the
more intensive the production
level, the more scope there is
for the disease to spread for
genetic changes to the virus.
The industry admits to
[T]he growing realization that
viruses previously innocuous
to natural host species have in
all probability become more
virulent by passage through
large commercial populations.
(Shane 2005, 22)
Unfortunately for us, through
some quirk of evolution, the respiratory tract of a chicken seems to bear
a striking resemblance (on a virus
receptor level) to our own respiratory tract (Gambaryan, Webster,
and Matrosovich 2002). So as the
virus gets better at infecting and
killing chickens, it may be getting
better at infecting and killing us.
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Virologist E. Brown is a specialist
in the evolution of influenza
viruses: “You have to say that high
intensity chicken rearing is a perfect environment for generating
virulent avian flu virus” (in Bueckert 2004, 6). To lower the risk of
generating increasingly dangerous
bird flu viruses, the global poultry
industry must reverse course away
from greater intensification.
Might not human beings want
birds confined indoors away from
waterfowl, though? Does it matter
from a public health standpoint if
the environment inside poultry
sheds can transform harmless
viruses into deadly viruses if the
harmless virus can’t get inside in
the first place? Unfortunately,
studies have uncovered widespread
disregard for this so-called biosecurity (Schmit 2005)—even in the
United States, where the industry
claims to have the best biosecurity
in the world (Canning 2005, n.p.).
According to Vaillancourt (2002,
12): “High biosecurity and proper
monitoring are still wishful thinking in many areas of intensive poultry production.” A 2002 bird flu
outbreak in Virginia led to the
deaths of millions of birds and
found its way inside two hundred
farms (Senne, Holt, and Akey
2003), highlighting just how wishful is the thinking that industrial
poultry populations are biosecure.
Based on the rapid spread of bird
flu in the United States in 2002,
leading USDA poultry researchers
concluded the obvious: “[B]iosecurity on many farms is inadequate”
(Suarez, Spackman, and Senne
2003, 896).
University of Maryland researchers
surveyed commercial chicken facilities throughout the Delmarva Peninsula, perhaps the densest concentration of chickens in the world,
and concluded that U.S. flocks “are
constantly at risk of infection triggered by poor biosecurity practices”
(Tablante et al. 2002, 896).
The intensive global poultr y
industry is not only playing with
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fire with no way to put it out, but it
is also fanning the flames, and firewalls to contain the virus do not
exist. “Unfortunately,” leading
USDA poultry virologist D. Senne
told an international gathering of
bird flu scientists, “that level of
biosecurity does not exist in U.S.
poultry production and I doubt
that it exists in other parts of the
world” (in Stegeman 2003, n.p.).
S.M. Shane (2003, 22) notes a
“decline in the standards of biosecurity in an attempt to reduce
costs in competitive markets.” The
decline is a contributing factor,
Shane concludes, in the frequency
and severity of disease outbreaks.
Biosecurity measures as currently practiced are better than
nothing but may not be something
on which to stake millions of
human lives for the sake of cheaper
chicken. A pandemic of H5N1, or a
comparable future bird flu virus,
has the capacity to spark the greatest medical catastrophe of all time.
It may be wiser to move away from
intensive poultry production altogether or, at the very least, stop
encouraging its movement into
the developing world.
Avian health expert K. Rudd,
drawing on thirty-seven years’ experience within the industry, warns:
Now is the time to decide. We
can go on with business as
usual, hoping for the best as
we charge headlong toward
lower costs. Or we can begin
making the prudent moves
needed to restore a balance
between economics and longrange avian health. We can pay
now or we can pay later. But it
should be known and it must
be said, one way or another we
will pay. (Rudd 1995, 20)
As the United Nations has urged,
combating factory farming may prevent the emergence of future
viruses, but there seems little hope
of eradicating H5N1. M. Osterholm,
the director of the U.S. Center for
Infectious Disease Research and
Policy and an associate director

within the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, has tried to
describe what an H5N1 pandemic
could look like. He suggests policy
makers consider the devastation of
the 2004 tsunami in South Asia:
“Duplicate it in every major urban
centre and rural community around
the planet simultaneously, add in
the paralyzing fear and panic of contagion, and we begin to get some
sense of the potential of pandemic
influenza” (in Kennedy 2005, A1).
“An influenza pandemic of even
moderate impact,” Osterholm
writes,
[W]ill result in the biggest single human disaster ever—far
greater than AIDS, 9/11, all
wars in the twentieth century
and the recent tsunami combined. It has the potential to
redirect world history as the
Black Death redirected European history in the fourteenth
century. (In Kennedy 2005,
A1)
One hopes the direction world
history will take is away from raising birds by the billions under
intensive confinement to potentially lower the risk of our ever
being in this same precarious situation in the future.

Will We Survive?
Former U.S. Senate Majority
Leader B. Frist described the recent slew of emerging diseases in
almost biblical terms: “All of these
[new diseases] were advance
patrols of a great army that is
preparing way out of sight” (in
Dennehy 2005, n.p.). J. Lederberg,
who won the Nobel Prize in medicine for his discoveries in bacterial
evolution, has said,
Some people think I am being
hysterical [referring to pandemic influenza], but there are
catastrophes ahead. We live in
evolutionary competition with
microbes—bacteria and viruses.
There is no guarantee that we
will be the survivors. (In CulliThe State of the Animals IV: 2007

ton 1990, 279)
In host-parasite evolutionary
dynamics, the so-called Red Queen
hypothesis attempts to describe
the unremitting struggle between
immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight,
each constantly evolving to try to
outsmart the other (Lythgoe and
Read 1998). Its name is taken from
L. Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass, in which the Red Queen
instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see,
it takes all the running you can do
to keep in the same place” (Carroll
1872, n.p.). Because the pathogens
keep evolving, human immune systems have to keep adapting as well
just to keep up. According to the
theory, animals who “stop running”
go extinct.
So far our immune systems have
largely retained the upper hand,
but the fear is that, given the current rate of disease emergence,
the human race is losing the race
(Culliton 1990). Mitchison (1993,
136) writes:
Has the immune system, then,
reached its apogee after the
few hundred million years it
had taken to develop? Can it
respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These
perfectly proper questions lack
sure answers because we are in
an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of
newly emerging infections].
According to Torrey and Yolken
(2005a), “Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a
more than two-billion-year head
start in this war, a victory by
recently arrived Homo sapiens
would be remarkable.”
J. Lederberg ardently believes
that emerging viruses may imperil
human society itself (in Drexler
2002). D. Morens says:
When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important
thing to look at is the bug.
When an enterovirus like polio
goes through the human gas-

trointestinal tract in three
days, its genome mutates
about two percent. That level
of mutation—two percent of
the genome—has taken the
human species eight million
years to accomplish. So who’s
going to adapt to whom? (In
Drexler 2002, 8)
Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that
the human evolutionary capacity to
keep up “may be dismissed as
almost totally inconsequential”
(Drexler 2002, 180). To help prevent the evolution of viruses as
threatening as H5N1, the least we
can do is take away a few billion
feathered test-tubes in which
viruses can experiment, a few billion
fewer spins at pandemic roulette.
The human species has existed
in something like our present form
for approximately 200,000 years.
“Such a long run should itself give
us confidence that our species will
continue to survive, at least insofar
as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote
A. Mitchison (1993, n.p.), the
Ehrlich prize-winning former
chairman of zoology at the University College of London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled
whilst passing a graveyard.”
According to a WHO spokesperson:
The bottom line is that
humans have to think about
how they treat their animals,
how they farm them, and how
they market them—basically,
the whole relationship between the animal kingdom and
the human kingdom is coming
under stress. (Torrey and
Yolken 2005a)
Along with human culpability,
though, comes hope. If changes in
human behavior can cause new
plagues, changes in human behavior may prevent them in the
future.
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